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I. Introduction
During the 2002 Annual Conference of the Pan Somali Council for
Peace and Democracy, popularly known as ISRAACA (unity), held in
Minnesota, U.S.A., a panel of experts in Somali society and its current
crises answered a slew of questions posed by a representative of the
Council’s Board of Directors.2 The main message that came out of the
panel session and a keynote address3 that preceded it was an apprecia-
tion of the mighty problems facing the reunification of the Somali
nation. The speakers were in agreement that the reestablishment of a
viable Somali state would take decades, if not generations, unless some
key ingredients in the Somali consciousness change. They all indicated
that before a reconfiguration of the Somali state can take place, the cur-
rent value system based on individualistic and/or clanistic and
regional loyalties should be largely replaced by one based on princi-
ples, faith, and patriotism. The majority of those experts contended
that education is the key to ingraining such new values in the Somali
consciousness. However, some panelists, notably Professor Ahmed
Ismail Samatar and former Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein, empha-
sized the critical role of leadership in making and sustaining a legiti-
mate and effective state. Drawing on his recent volume on the state in
Africa (co-edited with Abdi I. Samatar) and, more relevantly, on an
article co-authored with the same collaborator on Hussein and former
President Aden Abdulle Osman, Dr. Samatar elucidated that success-
ful states are characterized by four robust and reinforcing frames:
leader, regime, administrative apparatus, and collective conscious-
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ness.4 Samatar argued that the only government in Somali history that
approximated such a condition was the one headed by Abdirazak H.
Hussein (1964 – 1967) and presided over, as its head of state, by Aden
Abdulle Osman. He further suggested that unless a nucleus is created,
through education, for the development of a leadership with the neces-
sary self-confidence, moral code, vision, and competence, then collec-
tive consciousness will remain only a dream. Toward the conclusion of
the discussion, the panelists wondered whether ISRAACA could serve
as the spark that ignites the re-creation of the Somali society’s collec-
tive consciousness and accountability.
At the end of the session, the then-Chairman of the Board of Direc-
tors, Said Salah, invited all the panelists to become honorary members
of ISRAACA. However, some of the panelists later pointed out that
Somalis and other individuals and organizations need to know more
about ISRAACA’s mission, accomplishments, and limitations. The
authors of this article took that advice to heart. What follows is our
attempt to give a picture of what ISRAACA is and its prospects in
regenerating the Somali people’s mentalité.
II. Historical Background
A. The Inception: An Idea becomes a Reality
In a social gathering in 1997, some young Somali professionals in
Columbus, Ohio, discussed ways to improve the local conditions of
Somali people in the West as well as those in Somalia. Interviews with
some of those professionals revealed a willingness to get involved.
However, they expressed that there were two major constraints that
could negatively impact their agenda: the lack of manpower and eco-
nomic resources needed for the realization of this idea, and the nega-
tive overt and covert influences that narrow self-interest and clanism
have on most Somalis. Nonetheless, the professionals also realized that
with almost 200,000 Somalis in North America alone, there should be
ways to mitigate those liabilities.
In November 1997, the annual African Studies Association (ASA)
conference was held in Columbus, Ohio. The local professionals
learned that there were well-established Somali intellectuals who were
going to lead sessions on Somalia. In addition to the distinguished
Somali presenters, there was also an Inter-riverine Caucus in atten-
dance, which was scheduled to have its own private meeting at the
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end of the sessions. The Columbus group, represented by Dr. Abdinur
Sheikh Mohamed, Dr. Abukar Yusuf, and Mr. Abukar Arman, took
advantage of this rare opportunity and immediately extended an invi-
tation to all the Somalis and any other conference attendees interested
in Somali affairs.
Among those who came were Dr. Said Sheikh Samatar, Dr. Abdi
Kusow, Dr. Hassan Mahadallah, Dr. Alinur Mohamed, Ambassador
Mohamed Osman, and Dr. Jamil Mubarak. The encounter took place at
a training center near the hotel of the conference. The Columbus group
gave a picture of the local situation and conditions of the Somalis, and
asked for guidance in the following areas:
• Strategies to realize their belief that once the general public learned
about how united they were, there would be a better chance of
acceptance and respect by their fellow Somalis.
• Advice on how members of the group as well as other Somalis
could improve their dealings with each other as Somalis in order to
change the current situation.
• Strategies to deal with the ridicule or challenges that they may face
in bringing these wishes to reality.
• General guidance on practical ways of sharing their ideas of unity
with their peers and the Somali society in general.
The level of commitment and self-assurance from the locals sur-
prised the panel. Mohamed Osman, who spoke first, expressed his
receptiveness to the idea and pledged his support. Said Samatar spoke
second and said, “ . . . your ideas are excellent. We Somali elders have
been busy with bickering and quarreling amongst ourselves. However,
you young folks have a new energy with this idea and I believe you
can do something. Go ahead, take the leadership, and you have my
support.” Everyone participated in the discussion, and the meeting
culminated in a dinner at a local restaurant. Tensions among the
Somali groups attending the ASA conference were so reduced that the
Inter-riverine Caucus invited all Somalis at the conference to partici-
pate in their meeting. There was dynamism and renewed energy
among all attendees. Said Samatar asserted, “From this day on, I will
be an advocate for the inter-riverine communities and their plight in




Hassan Mahadallah and Alinur Mohamed decided to collaborate
with the Columbus group to bring the idea to fruition. The newly
enlarged group agreed to hold a meeting at the next ASA conference in
Chicago to forge strategies for turning the idea of unity into a tangible
reality.
B. The Chicago Meeting
During the 1998 African Studies conference, the group circulated an
invitation to all Somalis in attendance to participate in the general
Somali caucus. A total of nine people came. Present were Abukar
Arman, Abdinur Sheikh Mohamed, Abdulkadir Abdi, Alinur
Mohamed, Rashid Ahmed Gasle, Abdi Kusow, Hassan Mahadallah,
Ahmed Qasim Ali, and Sheikh Yusuf. There was no official agenda for
the meeting, although the unanimous agreement for the purpose of the
meeting was: We want to help our people and our country. Everyone
agreed to address any issue that was raised regardless of perceived rel-
evance, as long as it concerned the Somali people and the country of
Somalia, and to establish a listserv and use the Internet as a medium of
communication.
At the end of the conference it was decided that each member of the
group would recruit like-minded Somali individuals. This selective
recruitment process was particularly geared toward Somalis who
appeared to have transcended tribal mentality and were genuine in
their deeds. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for the Spring break
of 1999 in Columbus, Ohio. In addition, a listserv was set up to facili-
tate communications among members.
C. The Columbus Conference
There were approximately 30–40 participants at the Columbus confer-
ence. People traveled from all parts of the United States and Canada,
and agreed on the following organizational rules:
• To adhere to some basic rules of conduct and conference etiquette
• To value every participant’s input and to extend respect to all
• To encourage every participant to voice his/her opinion on issues
under discussion
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In addition, objectives and the pillars of the organization were estab-
lished. Priority was given to the deinstitutionalization of clanism, jus-
tice for all, and upholding a clean and democratic process.
There was unanimity to form an advocacy organization that repre-
sented all Somalis. Furthermore, the participants agreed that the orga-
nization should be registered as ISRAACA Ummadda Soomaaliyeed
(IUS). A temporary mission statement was adopted and two commit-
tees were established. The first, the Central Coordinating Committee,
was to coordinate all events for the organization. The elected members
were to manage and coordinate all discussions on the listserv, send out
communiqués about upcoming conferences, and set the agenda for the
next meeting. The second, the Constitution Committee, was assigned
to write a charter for the organization and ensure that all members
would receive a basic education on the charter.
D. The Toronto Conference, July 1, 1999
This meeting could be referred to as the first official conference of the
organization. The final communiqué of the meeting included the fol-
lowing:
• The organization’s name was changed from ISRAACA Ummadda
Soomaliyeed (IUS) to Ururka ISRAACA Ummadda Soomaaliyeed (UIUS)
• A basic code of conduct was established, using Robert’s Rules of
Order
• A new Ethics Committee was established to uphold the code of con-
duct
• A new Central Coordinating Committee (CCC) was elected: Mr. Ali
Fatah, Dr. Saido Ali, Dr. Hussein Ahmed Warsame, Mr. Said Salah,
and Mr. Abukar Arman
• The Constitution and Charter were ratified and adopted
• A Mission Statement and a Vision Statement were also finalized
• Membership dues were established at $100.00 for each U.S. resident,
with a differentiated geographical fee
• The organization would accept as members all individuals who
were genuinely interested in improving the conditions of the Somali




E. The Washington, D.C. Conference, May 29, 2000
The Washington, D. C. conference built on the achievements of the
Toronto conference. The following represent the main decisions made
in that conference:
• The name of the organization was changed from Ururka ISRAACA
Ummadda Soomaliyeed (UIUS) to Pan-Somali Council for Peace and
Democracy. However, ISRAACA was adopted as the Somali
acronym.
• The tradition of establishing a Central Coordinating Committee
(CCC) was discontinued and the first nine-member Board of Direc-
tors was elected. The elected officials were Ali Fatah, Abukar
Arman, Said Salah, Mumin Abdi Barre, Dr. Dr. Abdullahi Hassan
Mahdi, Shamsa Bashir Ali, Dr.Hassan Mahadallh, and Dr. Alinur
Mohamed.
• Special interest groups were established to concentrate on specific
issues.
• Position statements written under the auspices of the outgoing CCC
were ratified, with minor adjustments. The position statements con-
cerned such topics as tribalism, federalism, Islam, gender issues,
and the plight of the minority communities.
• Members of the local Washington, D. C., Somali community were
invited as observers.
• A technological committee was established, with Ahmed
Timacadde at the helm.
• A Forum management team was elected from the Board of Direc-
tors, with Said Salah elected as its first manager.
• The participants acknowledged the generosity of Mr. Mostafa
Abdillahi Jama, who donated $2,000 to cover the costs of the confer-
ence.
F. The Erie, Pennsylvania Conference, June 28, 2001
As others before it, the Erie conference built on the achievements of the
organization during the past years. Its final communiqué included the
following:
• ISRAACA’s first peace award was conferred. General Mohamed
Abshir Muse, a long-time Somali police commander and peace
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activist who was jailed by dictator Siyaad Barre for many years,
became the first recipient.
• The logo of the organization was finalized and adopted.
• The name of the Ethics Committee (EC) was changed to Ethics and
Conflict Resolution Committee (ECRC).
• The existing Mission Statement was revised to the current one. See
Appendix.
• The nine-person Board of Directors was increased to thirteen mem-
bers. The increase was made as a gesture of respect for a motion
made by General Abshir in memory of the number of people who
started the Somali Youth League (SYL). The motion passed, and the
following members of the Board of Directors were elected: Shamsa
Bashir Ali, Said Awad Muse, Ladan Affi, Abukar Arman, Abdalla
Hirad, Abdiwahab Tarey, Abukar Baale, Dr. Abdinur Sheikh
Mohamed, Dr. Alinur Mohamed, Ahmed Hamud, Dr. Hassan
Mahaddalh, Said Salah, and Dr. Hussein Ahmed Warsame.
• A report about the Arta events and its by-product, the TNG, was
given and the participants discussed if ISRAACA should be
involved. ISRAACA pledged commitment and conditional support
to work with the TNG on three important issues: Education, Con-
flict Resolution, and Human Rights.
• The first Political Action Committee (PAC) was formed, converting
ISRAACA from a mere advocacy-oriented body to a more progres-
sive and politically involved organization that could someday
become a political party.
G. The Minnesota Conference, June 29, 2002
Held in the Twin Cities of St. Paul/Minneapolis, this conference
received the most attention yet from the Somali communities in the
U.S. The conference influenced and was influenced by members of the
large Somali community in the Twin Cities. ISRAACA initiated the
granting of a Humanitarian Award to a personality who spent copious
amounts of time and effort to improve the conditions of Diaspora
Somalis. This was in addition to the Peace Award. The conference’s
final communiqué included the following:
• The thirteen-member Board of Directors was trimmed down to the
usual nine. The elected members were Said Salah, Dr. Alinur
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Mohamed, Dr. Hussein Ahmed Warsame, Khadar Bashir-Ali, Abdi
Goud, Shariffa Sabrie, Abukar Arman, Ali Bahar, and Dr. Ali Faqi.
• The Humanitarian Award went to Dr. Abdurahman Dirie, a local
physician who administers free health care to needy Somalis in the
Minneapolis/St. Paul area. The Peace Award went to Fartun Has-
san, the longstanding Somali Chargé d’Affaires at the UN, who kept
the UN Somali office open at her personal expense.
• The existing special interest groups were trimmed down to become
ad hoc and permanent committees. The five standing committees
are Human Rights, Education, Policy and Program Development,
Environment, and Reconciliation.
• Experts in the Somali conflict were invited to address the partici-
pants. A panel discussed topics ranging from education to religion,
community activism, and academic and political affairs. The pan-
elists were Professor Ahmed Ismail Samatar, Former Somali Prime
Minister Abdirazak Haji Hussein, Juris-Doctor Hassan Mohamoud
(Jamici), Eng. Abdulqadir Aden Abdulle, and Ms. Raho Warsame.
• Former TNG Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galeyr also addressed the
participants and spoke about his experience and what he learned in
his time of service in Somalia.
• Abwan (Poet) Said Salah led an inspirational session on Somali cul-
ture and poetry in order to build unity.
III. Organizational Structure
An organization’s ability to realize its aims and goals is, to a large
degree, determined by its structure. In other words, a fit needs to exist
between the structural composition of the organization and its activi-
ties. This is all the more important and especially challenging when, as
is the case with ISRAACA, the membership and the leadership are
scattered across the globe. In this respect, ISRAACA is a unique orga-
nization and the way it is run, as well as the aspirations of its members,
is a novelty in the Somali context.
Two primary factors have combined to engender the formation of
ISRAACA and which explain its idiosyncratic characteristics. First, the
protracted Somali civil war, which is still ongoing, has led to the mas-
sive displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, many of
whom migrated to Europe and North America. Second, at about the
time the Somali conflict was intensifying, globalization and its primary
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vehicle, the “Information Superhighway” (the Internet), emerged as a
tool for instant communication, virtually eliminating distance and ren-
dering temporal differences irrelevant. This last factor breathed life
into the desire on the part of the educated classes in the Diaspora to
vigorously search for an effective end to the stateless chaos in Somalia.
Despite its uniqueness, ISRAACA has a conventional structure. It is
governed by a Board of Directors, with subcommittees that include an
Executive Committee and a Forum Management Team (FMT). The
Executive Committee, comprised of five members, namely, the Chair,
the Vice-Chair, the Secretariat (two members), and the Treasurer, is
responsible for the day-to-day activities of the organization. The FMT
is responsible for ensuring the smooth operation of the Forum, which
is the main venue where issues are discussed among ISRAACA mem-
bers. However, for all practical purposes, the current nine members of
Board function as one unit and discuss all short-term and long-term
issues through a separate and Board-exclusive listserv.
The FMT is perhaps the only subcommittee whose job description is
usually shouldered only by its own members. The two-member FMT
conducts and oversees the business of the organization on a daily
basis, and interacts with the general membership through the elec-
tronic forum. The Forum, the infrastructural linchpin of the organiza-
tion, receives a large volume of messages daily, and it is necessary for
the FMT to read every single message in order to provide ongoing sup-
port and facilitation. The work of the FMT takes on a more critical
importance when there is a formal debate on the table. In such a case,
the FMT ensures that all members stick to the issue at hand. They also
enforce the rules of conduct, which many members are wont to violate.
The FMT is supported in their moderator role by a team of volun-
teers called “note-takers.” Their services are needed only when a for-
mal debate is taking place in the Forum. They compile and summarize
the ideas, putting them in a format that the Board can use for policy-
making purposes. Their summary notes are subsequently filed in the
archives for record keeping.
General policy issues are debated and decided by the entire Board,
most preferably by consensus. If an issue proves too controversial for a
consensus, as many issues are likely to be, simple majority rule is
applied by putting the matter to a vote. However, the most intractable
challenge that the Board faces is to ensure the timely discussion of
issues to be dealt with on an emergency basis. More often than not,
some members are not available to express their views, and the Board
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cannot make final decisions without hearing from each board member.
The nature of Internet communication, which presupposes each mem-
ber’s access to the Net and the luxury of time to check e-mails, is not
always conducive to making speedy decisions. The turnaround time
for certain sensitive issues is, therefore, longer than desired, compro-
mising the organization’s ability to respond to important matters in an
effective and prompt manner.
Similar problems are encountered when the Board shares its deci-
sions with the general membership through the Forum. Many mem-
bers tend to confuse the issues and dwell on highly marginal matters,
while not touching on the crux of the issue at hand. Others choose to
indulge in nitpicking and wanton negative criticism.
In addition to the subcommittees within the Board, there are stand-
ing committees that are responsible for formulating organizational
policies on a number of important issues. These committees, which are
referred to in the Charter as “Permanent Committees,” include the fol-
lowing:
1. Standing Committee on Human Rights
2. Standing Committee on Education
3. Standing Committee on Reconciliation and Governance
4. Standing Committee on Policy and Structure
5. Standing Committee on the Environment
6. Standing Committee on Membership Development
7. Standing Committee on Ethics and Conflict Resolution
Board members usually chair at least four of these standing commit-
tees. Experienced members, who are either past Board members or
members who work closely with the current Board, head the remain-
ing committees. At times, and particularly before the standing commit-
tees were formed, ad hoc committees were convened to deal with an
urgent issue. When that issue was dealt with, the committee was dis-
solved. Some of the past issues for which ad hoc committees were cre-
ated include the following:
1. The demonstration against Ethiopia in 2001
2. The Arta National Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000
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3. ISRAACA’s Organizational Structure
4. ISRAACA’s Constitution
5. Somalia’s Environmental/Ecological crisis
The Technological Committee is a special organ that is not elected.
Instead, individuals are chosen on the basis of their skills as well as
their goodwill to serve the organization. The Tech Committee is com-
prised of about five members with specialized information technology
(IT) training. They are responsible for providing the technical support
and expertise needed for the smooth running of ISRAACA’s day-to-
day operations. Their domain covers a wide range of areas, which
include keeping the archives, online communications, maintaining
member lists, running and updating the organization’s website, con-
necting new members and disconnecting suspended members, and
keeping the list up-to-date.
IV. Structural Evolution
The structure of ISRAACA has evolved from simple horizontal begin-
nings to a somewhat complex hierarchical pyramid. Over the years,
the number of directors serving the organization, for instance, has var-
ied from five to over ten. At one point, that number stood at thirteen,
which had a symbolic if somewhat anachronistic importance. In the
annual general meeting in Erie, some members felt strongly that
ISRAACA should seek not only to emulate but also to fulfill the role
and reflect the aspirations of the Somali Youth League (SYL), whose
founding members were thirteen. However, a number of pitfalls arose
from having an overly large board of directors that also proved quite
unwieldy. In any event, the merits of a lean team outweighed the sym-
bolic appeal of the SYL romanticism.
At the founding conference (Columbus, Ohio, March 1999), a Con-
stitutional Committee was formed on an ad hoc basis. This committee
drafted a charter and brought it to the Toronto Conference in July 1999,
where it was debated, amended, and adopted. At the same time, a
Coordinating Committee of five people was set up, which had a man-
date to run the organization until a permanent structure was put into
place. In Toronto, an Ethics and Discipline Committee was also
formed. This committee was charged with ensuring that members
adhere to the organization’s rules and bylaws, and to mete out penal-
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ties and sanctions in the form of suspensions and fines to those who
intentionally contravened the rules. However, it remained symbolic
until the Washington annual general meeting in 2000, when it was
transformed into a functioning committee.
In Washington, special interest groups numbering about fifteen
were created as well. These groups eventually evolved into the current
standing committees. Also in Washington, a Board of Directors con-
sisting of nine members was inaugurated. The Board replaced the
coordinating committee. The first outfit the Board created was the
Forum Management Team (FMT).
During the early stages of building ISRAACA, the organizational
structure was intentionally kept loose and the organization’s leader-
ship took a gradualist approach to keeping the group together. Rigid-
ity in structure was thought to constitute a danger by undoing the
limited and fragile unity of vision and purpose being cobbled together.
As such, flexibility in structure was deemed necessary to put in place a
solid foundation for the organization. In other words, at the beginning,
the first priority was internal capacity building before broader national
issues were tackled.
V. Institutional Challenges
In the initial phases of their formation, most organizations are weak
and fragile and are faced with hurdles. ISRAACA is no exception.
However, many believe that the fact that it held on to life up to this
point is, in and of itself, a tremendous success. Nevertheless, there are
more crucial challenges that have bedeviled the organization, some of
which it has dealt with quite successfully, while others continue to
come up every now and then. In this section, we examine the institu-
tional difficulties that the organization has faced since its inception.
A. Cyber-Based Mode of Communication
One significant challenge that ISRAACA continues to face is illustrated
by the communication method by which its members perform their
respective roles. We have talked about the geographic fragmentation
of the organization’s members, who are scattered across the globe.
Consequently, its natural choice of communication mechanism is the
Internet, without which this organization might never have come into
being. In fact, the Internet is the only economically feasible and, in
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practice, viable communication mode for an organization whose mem-
bership is so widely dispersed. But the primary downside to this mode
of communication, despite its other advantages including flexibility, is
the removal of organizational control from the hands of the leadership.
Not only does no one have any influence on what a particular member
writes or contributes but, worse, it is virtually beyond anybody’s con-
trol whether a member will participate in the first place.
As Nohria and Eccles put it: “you cannot build organizations on
electronic networks alone. If so, we will probably need an entirely new
sociology of organizations.”5 Indeed, electronic organizational forms
have successfully been used by the private sector in the West.
Microsoft, for instance, supports major global corporate customer sales
operations through virtual teams.6 Virtual organizations have a raft of
positive qualities, the most salient of which is their fluid and malleable
structure that enables them to adapt to the ever-changing needs of the
marketplace and the vast array of skills its members possess. Thus,
they offer flexibility, responsiveness, increased efficiency, and cost
competitiveness. Similar successes in the use of virtual teams have
been registered in the public sector with respect to service delivery and
e-government, which many consider to be revolutionary in terms of
their contribution to the effectiveness of democratic processes. How-
ever, the voluntary sector does not have the tools or the incentive
structure available to the public and private sectors to effectively cap-
ture the benefits of this communication medium. On the contrary,
there are systemically inherent weaknesses—such as absenteeism, role
ambiguity, duplication of effort, and low individual commitment —
that do not lend themselves to the easy use of virtual organizational
forms by voluntary-based groups.7 In fact, some scholars question the
long-term viability of virtual organizations without constant physical
contact among members.8
This dysfunctional characteristic of virtual organizations manifests
itself in ISRAACA quite frequently. On many occasions, one wonders
whether the Forum is not a chatroom or a newsgroup. For instance,
some members take the liberty of posting information (such as news
items and articles written by outsiders) that at best has only remote
links with the organization and its core issues. These lead to an over-
load of information that impedes the ability of other members to con-
centrate on the bigger issues. More often than not, these types of
postings cause a great deal of commotion within the membership, as
some disparage the judgment of those who post them while the propo-
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nents fight back with equal ferocity. Even when the Forum Manage-
ment Team succeeds in confining discussions to issues at the table, the
quality of contributions is hardly first-rate or consistent across the
active membership. However, once in a while an issue may actually
receive extensive discussion leading to an important outcome in the
form of a policy document or a course of action to be adopted. But
even in these cases, there is no assurance that the membership will act
on the outcome of the discussion.
B. Language Choice
An issue that received a lot of attention at the inception of the organi-
zation was the question of what language to use as the medium of
communication. The majority of the forum membership are Western-
educated Somalis who live in North America and Western Europe,
and whose preferred language of written communication is English.
But there was also a sizable minority that advocated Somali instead of
English. Those who felt strongly that Somali should be used predi-
cated their position on obvious cultural and symbolic reasons. They
argued that to use a foreign language in an entirely Somali forum was
not only detrimental to the promotion of the cultural and linguistic
advancement of Somalis but was also shameful — shameful because it
reflected an absence of confidence in their culture on the part of the
“Somali intelligentsia,” who were supposed to be the vanguard of the
cultural preservation of the disintegrated nation. This argument struck
a chord, particularly with the Diaspora communities whose children
were born outside of Somalia and have largely embraced the cultures
and languages of their adopted countries.
However, there were other strategic reasons for choosing English
over Somali. Many members, including some in the leadership, believe
that if English had not been the medium of communication, the organi-
zation would not have survived to this point. In their opinion, English
lessens the importance of culturally divisive concepts such as clanism,
the eternal scourge of Somalis. It undermines the automatic attribution
of ideas to groups rather than to the individual expressing them,
which often translated into confrontation along clan lines. Put differ-
ently, writing in English eliminates differences in Somali dialects
within the membership, differences that can lead to irrational stereo-
typing and prejudicial judgment of people’s writings.
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Thus, in line with the wishes of the majority, the organization
resolved that English would be its language of communication. Never-
theless, Somali is still permitted for those who prefer it to English. In
other words, both languages are considered acceptable as means of
communication within the organization. Yet for the strategic reasons
mentioned above, English is encouraged.
C. Creating Trust
Another challenge was how to establish trust and an environment in
which people could collaborate and work together toward common
goals, some of which were ill defined or not commonly shared. Differ-
ences in goals reflected the general context within which individual
members were trying to act and the overall condition of a Somali soci-
ety marked by societal fragmentation and national bifurcation. This
forced the leadership to be too transparent—and hence slow in taking
action—at the expense of efficiency in developing and executing orga-
nizational policies.
Trust is a function of social relationships and past or future mem-
bership in social groups that share common norms of obligation and
collective responsibilities.9 Even though some groups had known each
other for a long time, the majority of members have had no formal
relationships with the rest of the team. Neither is it certain that there
will be a future membership of a common club. So, new members
make up their minds as to whether they want to stay on and become
active members based on their initial experience and the perceived
compatibility of their ideals and goals with that of the organization. A
“negative experience” in the first few days of joining may reinforce an
a priori prejudice that ISRAACA is dominated by a particular clan,
leading to low trust or leaving the organization altogether. Low trust
leads to high membership turnover and a poor quality of work by the
remaining members, two defects that ISRAACA seems to display.
Indeed, this is a challenge that is not unique to ISRAACA. Rather, it
is shared with other web-based “virtual” organizations, for it is a
daunting task to create and maintain a lasting trust among members
who are divided by time, space, and in some cases ideology.10 How-
ever, if these factors work to impede the organization’s effectiveness in
achieving its objectives, there are others that counterbalance them,
namely, culture and a common vision (however nebulous) to spear-
head positive changes in Somali society.
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The sheer time and effort required to manage the logistics of com-
munication, as well as the continuously volatile situation in Somalia,
can pose serious problems. Perhaps because of this, the development
of trust, a shared team culture, and agreed-upon procedures for effec-
tive communication and the implementation of organizational pro-
grams remain elusive goals.
D. Lack of an Enforcement Mechanism
Volunteers run ISRAACA. Therefore, ISRAACA grapples with the
malaise that other volunteer-run organizations suffer from; namely,
limited individual commitment and being at the mercy of its member-
ship’s generosity with their time and resources. An important aspect of
this challenge is the limited participation of the majority of members.
Rough estimates of the percentage of active members in forum discus-
sions put it below 50 percent, hence the popular term “silent majority,”
referring to those who read messages and postings but never partici-
pate in discussions. It is ironic that some able members attend and par-
ticipate effectively in annual general meetings but do not contribute
anything electronically. Perhaps this is due to the language barrier
and/or annual membership dues. The language issue, the background
of which was discussed earlier, is an obvious possibility. There are
many members whose proficiency in English is weak. Even if they
know enough to express themselves, they may not feel confident
enough to try it. They can, of course, write in Somali (which some
members do), but they tend to opt for silence over being the odd one
out.
With respect to the fees, until recently there was a policy of tiered
membership, in which paid (effective) members and non-paid (non-
effective) members were allowed to co-exist. Payment of the member-
ship fee was irrelevant when it came to enjoying organizational
amenities. Both categories of membership had unfettered access. How-
ever, only effective members were eligible to join special committees
and task forces or vote on motions. This created a perverted incentive
system in which many prospective members naturally opt for a free
ride, effectively dispossessing the organization from an opportunity to
raise funds and enlist the services of volunteer members. Non-paying
members also deliberately lie low, lest they are seen to be taking
advantage of something to which they do not contribute financially.
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The organization relies entirely on the goodwill of its members,
which in many cases proves to be quite whimsical. Committees are
formed and asked to draw up their terms of reference as well as their
action plan. So, essentially there is no mechanism to ensure that mem-
bers participate in debates and discussions or for committee members
to pitch in on the committee’s tasks. The result is that the burden, both
financial and physical (in terms of doing actual work), falls upon a
small number of members.
E. Scarce Resources
Since its inception, ISRAACA has completely relied upon membership
dues for its financial needs. A graded fee structure is used in which
residents in the U.S. pay the highest annual membership fees, followed
by those in Canada, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Middle
East and Africa, respectively. Students also pay relatively low dues.
The revenue generated through membership collections hardly covers
the organization’s overhead costs. In the past, it was not uncommon
for board members to pay for some costs from their own pockets with-
out ever getting reimbursed. Obviously, then, the lack of resources has
been one of the main reasons ISRAACA has accomplished little in the
way of concrete projects to fulfill its mandate.
One area the organization is yet to seriously explore is external
funding sources. According to Abukar Arman, the current Chairman,
seeking funding from external sources has been deliberately avoided,
at least thus far. In his opinion, that policy served the organization well
by instilling a certain level of discipline and self-reliance into its ethos.
However, Arman acknowledges that external funding cannot be post-
poned any longer. Up until now, the focus of the organization’s efforts
was on internal growth and consolidating the organizational founda-
tion of ISRAACA. But now that the organization is entering into the
phase of action, it is essential to translate ISRAACA’s vision — so far a
mere dream—into a tangible set of projects leading to concrete results.
For this to happen, there must be a push to procure more resources,
both human and financial.
As a result, some in the organization feel that ISRAACA must
inevitably find ways to raise funds from outside sources because
annual membership contributions can no longer sustain it. The impor-
tance of fundraising is not lost on the organization’s leadership. At
Erie, a Fundraising Committee, composed of four members, was
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appointed and charged with exploring fundraising options. The Com-
mittee delivered a preliminary report at the Minneapolis meeting and
suggested a number of ways to raise funds. Unfortunately, all of the
measures were aimed at internal sources, such as increasing member-
ship dues and instituting other types of charges like a registration fee.
None of the suggestions touched on external possibilities of accessing
resources. The Committee’s mandate was extended until the next gen-
eral meeting, scheduled to take place in Columbus, Ohio, in the sum-
mer of 2003. In a nutshell, the challenge of obtaining sufficient
resources for its activities and operations remains one of the most
intractable issues facing ISRAACA in the immediate future. A solution
to this problem is a necessary prerequisite for concrete action.
F. Elitist Image
In the eyes of some, ISRAACA has become an elitist organization. To
be sure, many of the members have certain attributes in common. For
instance, the vast majority of members are Western-educated individu-
als who share a general outlook, albeit not a coherent one, of the
Somali question and its possible solutions. While this semi-homoge-
nous membership composition resulted from a natural process of self-
selection, it may also have resulted from some equivocal policies in
ISRAACA.
In the 1999 Toronto annual general meeting, a suggestion was made
that the attainment of higher education (a minimum of a Bachelor’s
degree) should be a prerequisite for membership in ISRAACA. This
was rejected but the requirement of a high school diploma was
adopted. Another issue in this regard is that the fees are quite exorbi-
tant for many prospective members.
The cumulative result of these factors is that ISRAACA is, by and
large, disconnected from the people whom it was created to serve,
both in Somalia and within the Diaspora. One way to fill this gap was
seen to be the establishment of local chapters in major cities, both in
Somalia and in the countries where there are significant Somali com-
munities. This has been implemented in a few cases, mainly in Colum-
bus, Washington, and Minneapolis/St. Paul. Other Somali
strongholds, such as Toronto, London, San Diego, and Scandinavia,
are yet to form effective chapters that serve as a bridge between the
organization and the Somali masses, including those back in Somalia.
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The current Chair, Abukar Arman, believes that the elitism problem
is a fleeting one that the organization will outgrow as it sets out to
implement its objectives and goals.
VI. Ideological Differences
As defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ideology is “a manner or
the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or cul-
ture.” Alternatively, it can be defined as “the integrated assertions, the-
ories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program.” In this article,
we take a broad definition of ideology. We lump into the rubric of ide-
ology all issues and matters that lead to or hinder the agreement of
opinion about the causes of the current Somali conundrum and the
approaches to solving it. As a result, some of what we discuss in this
section may not qualify as ideology in the strict sense of the term.
Although ideological differences among members in ISRAACA
may weaken the organization’s ability to act, on many occasions they
do not constitute such an inherent contradiction in its philosophy that
they could ultimately lead to its final demise, at least from the experi-
ence thus far. The positive aspect of this, however, is that the organiza-
tion represents a cross-section of the Somali society’s spectrum of
thought and perspective.
A. ISRAACA’s Identity and Role
In many ways, ISRAACA seems to be in confusion about its primary
raison d’etre. This confusion crops up every now and then, in particular
whenever a sensitive political issue requires a course of action to be
adopted. The point of contention in this regard is whether ISRAACA
should continue to be an advocacy organization or whether it should
play the role of a political movement.
Indeed, this ambiguous understanding of the organization’s role in
political matters dates back to its early days. Some members con-
tended then that ISRAACA should be an advocacy body that concen-
trates on human rights and environmental, developmental, and other
social justice issues, serving as a watchdog on the policies and actions
of any future government. They argued that working in any manner
with the powers-that-be would compromise the organization’s inde-
pendence, thereby making it vulnerable to cooptation. The opposing
view was that before it scrutinizes the behavior of established author-
Bildhaan Vol. 3
34
ity, ISRAACA should participate in the re-creation of state institutions,
which at the present are nonexistent, meaning that there is currently
nothing to watch over. This would make it inevitable that ISRAACA
must play a direct political role in the peace-building process and dur-
ing the transitional period. The argument went that as an organization
whose membership comprises some of the best and the brightest of the
country, ISRAACA does not have the luxury of waiting in the wings in
these times of dire need. In fact, some members went so far as to sug-
gest that ISRAACA be a political party and tackle head-on the real
issues facing the country.
The compromise, after a lengthy and sometimes heated debate, was
to start out as an advocacy group but to transform in the long run into
a movement or a political party. To this end, the Political Action Com-
mittee (PAC) was created at the Erie annual general meeting in 2001 to
start the process of transformation. The problem, however, is that there
is no well-defined timeframe for the change, and so it is not clear when
and in what manner that transformation should occur. This is, appar-
ently, a source of the confusion.
There is another dimension to the debate about ISRAACA’s proper
role and long-term goals. Here the issue is whether ISRAACA’s advo-
cacy or political activities (whichever is adopted) should focus on the
community in the Diaspora or the problems in the homeland. It is
interesting to note that the majority of female members were in favor
of the organization devoting itself to programs addressing the vast
sociocultural needs of the Diaspora community. Their male counter-
parts, on the other hand, argued that Diaspora issues were, by and
large, being dealt with by existing local community-based groups and
therefore ISRAACA should focus on the multifaceted problems of the
homeland.
This gender-based dichotomy can be partly explained by two
things: the traditional domination of political matters by men; and the
burden of Diaspora problems, such as increased family break-ups,
juvenile delinquency and intergenerational cultural clashes, predomi-
nantly borne by women. The chief reason for this is that there are
increasingly female-headed households, and even when males are the
heads of the family, they tend to leave household matters to the discre-
tion of the mothers, occupying themselves with breadwinning con-
cerns.
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B. Islamism versus Secularism
One of the first ideological clashes was over the role of Islam in the life
and affairs of ISRAACA. During the initial constitutional debates, it
was suggested that ISRAACA’s governing code of conduct should be
guided by and reflect the tenets of Islam. This camp stressed the
importance Islam has had in the social and historical development of
the Somali nation. In particular, they pointed to the fact that Islam is a
source of strength in times of hardship and a way of transcending
myopic and clanistic divisions. This was a powerful argument and a
good reason to rally people around the single most resilient common
denominator, which could be used as a tool to unify the disintegrated
society.
However, not everybody saw the importance of Islam in rebuilding
Somalia in the same light. Some members took issue with the sugges-
tion that Islam is the single most salutary unifying factor, proposing
instead that ISRAACA be purely secular. This group espoused the
adoption of the Western practice that State and Religion should be
kept separate. The same division of opinion on this issue came up in a
number of occasions involving questions of gender, Somalia’s interna-
tional relations and political alignments (e.g., Arab versus African),
and the creation of a strong and legitimate basis for a future undivided
Somalia. As a result, two diametrically opposed texts were brought
forward in the Toronto meeting in 1999, where most constitutional
issues were thrashed out. In fact, some members tried to translate this
divergence in perspective into one between Islamism and Democracy,
an interpretation others regarded as a false dichotomy. There
appeared, therefore, the need for a middle ground, one that was
achieved through a vote after a long debate and a series of compro-
mises and concessions on both sides.
The compromise text adopted after a great deal of wheeling and
dealing (Paragraph 3 of Article 3 in the Charter) states that one of
ISRAACA’s objectives is to “foster and promote Islamic and construc-
tive Somali cultural values.”
C. The Arta Peace Process and the TNG
Many analysts consider the Arta Conference, which was organized
and hosted by the Djibouti Government in the year 2000, as a water-
shed in post-civil war Somali politics. For the first time since the col-
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lapse of the Somali state, an inclusive reconciliation conference con-
vened, participated in by most of the stakeholders in the conflict —
including for the first time unarmed civil society groups. For the most
part, the ISRAACA membership, like other Somali groups, greeted the
Arta Conference with cautious optimism. But support for and opposi-
tion to Arta and the resulting institutions (primarily the Transitional
National Government, the TNG) was quite fluid in the beginning. It
was not until the Conference drew to a close that debates and positions
started to take shape.
Two camps emerged, one for and the other against the outcome of
Arta. The first group asserted that Arta, for all its deficiencies and
shortcomings, constituted the best hope for the Somali nation. The
warlords, they argued, had failed to agree on anything beneficial for
the country and were in tacit (if not explicit) agreement to maintain the
status quo. According to this perspective, therefore, Arta was the only
option. This was all the more so given the continued indifference of the
international community to the plight of the Somali people, as well as
the increased interference of Somalia’s hostile neighbor, Ethiopia, in its
internal affairs. These were, in their opinion, a clear recipe for the
balkanization and subsequent wiping off of the whole Somali state
from the international map.
The other group, while not disputing the failure of the warlords to
make peace, felt that Arta was discredited by the domination of Siyaad
Barre era politicians. The process itself was also seen as fundamentally
flawed. More specifically, the clanistic power-sharing mechanism
devised in Arta was not only wrong but was dangerous to the future of
the nation, as it would feed the institutional conflicts that engendered
the violent chaos in the first place. As such, they reasoned, its outcome
could not lead to a legitimate and acceptable system of governance.
A controversial conditional support for the TNG was grudgingly
passed in Erie in 2001. Some prominent figures in the TNG, including
ISRAACA members, campaigned hard to convince ISRAACA to sup-
port the TNG in at least ten areas. The conditional support was mired
by controversy and deep-seated divergence of opinion, creating two
rival camps: one vehemently opposing the TNG and the other an
ardent supporter of it. The ultimate impact of the controversy was to
nullify the idea of lending the TNG a helping hand, with the exception
of some cantankerous letters critical of the TNG’s failure to address
ecological and land ownership crises.
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Later, some in the organization’s leadership tried without much
success to reconcile Dr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, then the prime minister of
the TNG, and former prime minister Abdirazak Haji Hussein regard-
ing a row over the Reconciliation and Property Restitution Committee
created in Arta, which Abdirazak was initially appointed to head.
VII. Concluding Remarks: Potential of ISRAACA
Apart from the multiple challenges it is facing, ISRAACA has good
potential to help forge a national vision and a lasting imprint on Soma-
lia’s future. For one thing, it is the only truly multi-kin Somali organi-
zation that transcends clan divisions and is devoted to the struggle for
a collective consciousness leading to a unified and democratic Somali
state. Members are predominantly educated and are very much expe-
rienced in cross-cultural perspectives — many have been trained and
currently live in the Diaspora. It is a movement that seeks to crystallize
habits and institutions that Somalia needs to prosper in the long run, a
way of being that goes beyond the limited traditional Somali realm.
However, despite the mission, the vision, and the objectives outlined
in the charter and by-laws, some former members of the organization
believe that ISRAACA cannot go forward until it comes up with
tighter principles beyond just the wish for Somali unity.
Dr. Abdishakur Sh. Ali Jowhar was a prominent member of the
organization until he quit in 2000. Abdishakur was one of a small
group of Internet-savvy ISRAACA members (others included Said-
Sugaan and Musa Nasir) who moved the membership to a new listserv
after an internal struggle caused the collapse of its initial listserv. To all
appearances, Jowhar was comfortable with the ideals of ISRAACA
until the Arta process ended up installing the TNG in Mogadishu. As it
turned out, Jowhar and a few other members became upset with what
they thought was blanket support for the TNG, even though the orga-
nization’s only official reaction to the Arta process was a press release
of advice. In a comment solicited by the authors of this article, Jowhar
explained his position this way:
ISRAACA is the only current political organization of Somalis that is
based on the concept of Somali nationalism. It is unique in this sense. It
is the legitimate heir of the SYL. ISRAACA sees itself as the spark that
may ignite the dormant fire of Somali nationalism. On my part, I have
come to the conclusion that Somali nationalism is and has been dead for
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some time. To me, ISRAACA is the ghost of a nation roaming around the
world in a permanent exile. This is the basis of divergence and the cause
of separation. It was a mutually beneficial parting of ways. There is one
major weakness of this organization. Like the SYL before it, ISRAACA as
an organization is bereft of any principles beyond the concept of a united
Somalia. Its members may find the rule of a warlord, a corrupt leader-
ship, tribal governance or foreign occupation distasteful. They may even
opt for a modern democratic state if given the chance. But they will
accept any of the above if it brings about the unity of the Somali nation
under one government. ISRAACA should exorcise itself of this absence
of principles or cease to exist.
As is apparent, Jowhar believes that the nationalism and unity ori-
entation that the organization prides itself on is its main weakness. In
fairness, ISRAACA does believe in certain principles. As its name
(Pan-Somali Council for Peace and Democracy) connotes, it struggles
for unity; but only through a process characterized by “peace, justice,
and democracy.” Given this public assertion, it is unlikely that many of
the current members of the organization will show much sympathy for
Abdishakur’s critique. However, perceptions are sometimes stronger
than reality; and he is not alone in expressing that the members of
ISRAACA, like the larger Somali society, have a lot of contradictions to
deal with before they can build a structure with a collective and robust
consciousness.
Ali Fatah, former Chairman of ISRAACA’s Board of Directors,
resigned from his position as well as membership in 2000. In an e-mail
message that the authors solicited, he wrote the following:
When I first joined the Association in early spring, 1999, I was a ‘card
carrying skeptic’ on Somali national issues. I was pleasantly surprised,
however, when a few of the original members welcomed me warmly. I
also found the initial burst(s) of debate both lively and (for the most
part) civil. I participated in the debates, as time permitted, with some
degree of enthusiasm. For the next several months, I remained hopeful
enough to have traveled to Toronto, Canada, in July of that year to par-
ticipate in the inaugural meeting of the infant organization. It was at that
meeting that we fashioned the organization’s vision, mission, goals and
objectives: to advance the sociopolitical and economic interests of the
Somali nation, in an environment that is free of the destructive impulse
attendant to neo-clanism. I was elected chair of a temporary board. We
had a fairly good year mainly as UN-style peacekeepers. We also regis-
tered the organization and established it in Washington, D.C. By all
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accounts the 2000 conference in Washington, D.C. was successful.
Against my better judgment, I allowed myself to be elected chair once
again. Shortly thereafter, Arta happened. With it all the rotten contradic-
tions that we Somalis were hitherto willing to sweep under the rug were
suddenly in the open air, ‘stinking to high heaven,’ so to speak. The
resultant discord taught me, and I think many others, that the Somali
personality consists of two irreconcilable strands: 1) undying loyalty to
the clan system that nurtured us through thin and thick, and 2) instinc-
tive rebellion against foisted authority (from whatever quarter). The
upshot is that Somali intellectuals can neither solve this quandary nor
can they wish it away. And, therein lies ISRAACA’s problems!
As explained earlier, one of the strengths of ISRAACA is that it tries
to learn from its setbacks. Losing valuable members such as, among
others, Dr. Jowhar, Mr. Fatah, Dr. Abdillahi Mahdi, Dr. Arush, Mr.
Mostafa Abdillahi Jama, Mr. Mohamed Mukhtar Hussein, and Dr.
Abdiaziz Haji Hussein, was no doubt a great setback. But the organiza-
tion survived, mainly because it saw merit in the grievances that
caused these good men to leave, and it tried and continues to work to
correct the weaknesses and limitations.
ISRAACA cannot see itself as a success at this point in its history.
But it is, no doubt, a survivor, like the Somali people. Throughout his-
tory, Somalis have faced disasters caused by nature, colonialism, dicta-
torship, clanism, and general chaos. Despite those disasters, they still
exist as a nation (if not as a state). They are more educated than ever;
there is more wealth in their hands; and they are accumulating new
and instructive experiences in almost every zone of the world. The
support of Diaspora Somalis would go far and be more organized if
there was a state that could create a more stable and less risky environ-
ment for wealth creation, education, and technology transfer. As was
stated by Samatar and Samatar, the Somalis were Africa’s first democ-
rats.11 The potential is still there for contemporary Somalis to re-enter,
as leaders, Africa’s struggle for a peaceful and democratic political life.
Consequently, there may be a silver lining in the protracted discus-
sions taking place among Somalis. Debates without violence are criti-
cal ingredients in any democratization process. ISRAACA is a pivotal
organization in this important orientation and conduct. The hope is
that patience and endurance will sow the seeds for Somalia’s collective
consciousness and accountability. ISRAACA welcomes any Somali
who aspires to think outside of the clanist box. The future belongs to




Just before the current issue of Bildhaan was sent for publication, the
2003 ISRAACA annual general meeting was concluded in Columbus,
Ohio. It elected its first woman chair, Ladan Affi. The following mem-
bers of the Board of Directors are: Ladan Affi, Current Chair; Zainab
Hassan, Treasurer; Khadar Bashir-Ali, Secretary; Abdinur Aw-Ali,
Forum Manager; Abukar Arman, Member; Hassan Mahadallah, mem-
ber; Said Salah, Member.
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APPENDIX
ISRAACA’S VISION
To become a prominent advocacy organization that promotes Somali
unity based on equality, justice and respect for the rights of (all) its cit-
izenry.
ISRAACA’S MISSION
The Pan-Somali Council for Peace and Democracy (ISRAACA) is a
non-profit organization that will strive for the realization of its dream
of reconciled Somali people and the creation of good governance for
Somalia, and will collaborate with and support all organizations, eco-
nomic, political, and social, whose objectives are compatible with those
of ISRAACA through its Political Action Committee (PAC).
ISRAACA AIMS TO:
1) Advocate for Somali unity, justice, equality, peace and appreciation
of cultural diversity.
2) Advance and support freedom of expression, consistent with
Islamic values, freedom of assembly, and of thought.
3) Foster and promote the evolution of progressive political, social and
economic institutions.
4) Develop projects and programs designed to deinstitutionalize
clanism in public and government operations.
5) Foster and promote effective participation of women in all aspects
of public life.




a) Carrying out public educational campaigns both in the Diaspora
and inside Somalia
b) Supporting and collaborating with organizations with compati-
ble objectives
c) Conducting organizational activities, conventions, and confer-
ences in and outside Somali territory
d) Promoting its platforms with peaceful and non-violent methods
and techniques
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